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What Do Management Earnings Forecasts Convey About the Macroeconomy?
Abstract
We decompose quantitative management earnings forecasts into macroeconomic and firm-specific
components to determine the extent to which voluntary disclosure provided by management has
macroeconomic information content. We provide evidence that the forecasts of bellwether firms,
which are defined as firms in which macroeconomic news explains the greatest amount of varia-
tion in the forecasts, provide timely information to the market about the macroeconomy when
bundled with earnings announcements. Further, we show that bellwether firms provide timely
information about both industry-specific events and broader economic events. Finally, we doc-
ument that the macroeconomic news in individual forecasts is more pronounced for bad news
and point forecasts.
Keywords: Voluntary disclosure, management earnings forecasts, bellwether firms, macroe-
conomic risk
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1 Introduction
One would hardly confuse corporate executives with professional macroeconomic forecasters. Unlike
economic forecasters, executives must make actual operating, investing, and financing decisions and,
at best, they may rely upon the insights of the former to aid in their decision-making. If their firms
are subject to macroeconomic risks, however, corporate executives may indirectly be privy to timely
information about the underlying macroeconomic state that could, in turn, be transmitted to the
broader market via management earnings forecasts. In this study, we examine whether management
earnings forecasts convey timely information about the macroeconomic state.
The working assumption in the voluntary disclosure literature is that managers have private in-
formation, which is strategically communicated to investors and analysts via voluntary disclosures
like management earnings forecasts.1 From an empirical perspective, however, the nature of the
private information communicated by management is not well understood. In this study, we add
to the understanding of management’s information advantage by assessing whether some of the
information communicated via management earnings forecasts pertains to undiversifiable macroe-
conomic risks, as opposed to diversifiable firm or industry specific risks. If management earnings
forecasts do provide timely macroeconomic information, that observation would, in turn, contribute
to the broader understanding of how macroeconomic information is disseminated throughout the
economy.
Whether or not management’s earnings forecasts are a timely source of macroeconomic infor-
mation is far from clear. More specifically, managers may not have the expertise necessary to
generate timely information about macroeconomic outcomes. For example, Ben-David, Graham,
and Harvey (2012) document that managers exhibit significant miscalibration in their predictions
of stock market returns and Hutton, Lee, and Shu (2012) document that analyst forecasts are more
accurate than management forecasts when a firm’s prospects are tied to macroeconomic factor re-
alizations. Both of these observations might cast doubt on management’s ability to provide timely
macroeconomic information via their earnings forecasts. On the other hand, management earnings
forecasts may still convey macroeconomic information even if managers do not fully process and
impound their private macroeconomic information into their forecasts.
1See, for example, Dye (1985) or Verrecchia (1983).
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In our initial analysis, we decompose realized earnings into two components, a macroeconomic
component that is determined by proxies for macroeconomic state variables and a firm-specific
component. To determine the nature of the information held by management at the time of the
earnings forecast, we then regress the earnings forecast on estimates of the macroeconomic and
firm-specific components of the earnings realization being forecast to estimate how much of the
variation in the earnings forecast is attributable to the macroeconomic and firm-specific compo-
nents of earnings. We compare the ratio of the percentage of variation in the forecast attributable to
the macroeconomic component over the percentage attributable to the firm-specific component to
the same ratio for earnings. The mean (median) of the difference in the two ratios is positive (pos-
itive) and significantly (insignificantly) different from zero suggesting that the private information
underlying management forecasts is, perhaps, slightly more weighted towards the macroeconomic
state relative to the impact of the macroeconomic state on earnings itself. Finally, we show there
is significant cross-sectional variation in the extent to which the variation in the forecasts are ex-
plained by the macroeconomic component of earnings, which suggests that some firms’ forecasts
contain significantly more information about the macroeconomic state.
Even though management forecasts contain macroeconomic information in addition to firm-
specific information, we do not know whether the forecasts provide timely information regarding
the macroeconomic state. There is substantial evidence that security market prices are leading
indicators of the macroeconomic state, where that state is defined by aggregate statistics such as
GDP, industrial production, and investment (see, for example, Barro, 1990; Fama, 1981, 1990),
and consistent with that evidence, the stock market is often viewed as a leading economic indicator
for entities tracking the economy, such as The Conference Board. One argument put forth for why
security markets lead the economy is that security market participants price securities based upon
the information they have about future real economic activity. Management forecasts might be
a source of such information either because they are forecasts of a component characterizing the
macroeconomic state (i.e., corporate profits are a direct component of GDP under one computation
approach for that statistic) or because they are correlated with other components characterizing
the macroeconomic state.2
We employ a short-window event study analysis to test whether management earnings fore-
2For information regarding how macroeconomic statistics are measured, see McCulla and Smith (2007).
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casts provide timely macroeconomic information. In our event study approach, we test whether
individual forecast surprises are associated with market portfolio returns, excluding the return of
the forecasting firm, during short windows around the forecast announcement date. Consistent
with management forecasts providing timely macroeconomic information, and after controlling for
earnings announcements as well as a number of other lagged macroeconomic variables, we find that
firms’ forecasts are associated with market returns during the forecast announcement window. We
further hypothesize that the market’s response to a firm’s forecast should be greater if the forecast
contains more macroeconomic information, as measured by the estimate of the macroeconomic in-
formation impounded into forecasts. We provide strong evidence consistent with this hypothesis.
In fact, the market return during the forecast announcement window is significant only for firms
considered to possess high macroeconomic information content in their forecasts.
In addition to assessing whether forecasts contain timely macroeconomic information, we assess
whether the macroeconomic information in forecasts is due to the forecasts reflecting undiversifi-
able shocks just affecting a significant industry in the economy or shocks broadly affecting many
industries in the economy. To do so, we divide the market portfolio into two sub-portfolios for each
forecast: the portfolio of firms within the same industry as the forecasting firm and those outside
the “division” of the forecasting firm, as defined by the Department of Labor.3 We document that
the association between forecast surprise and coincident returns to both sub-portfolios are signifi-
cant, which is consistent with at least some forecasts containing macroeconomic news relevant to
many industries. We also provide some evidence that the magnitude of the return for the portfolio
of firms within the same industry is more pronounced than the portfolio comprised of the remainder
of the market, which is consistent with macroeconomic information being somewhat more relevant
for the disclosing firm’s industry.
We conduct additional analysis on particular attributes of high macroeconomic information
content forecasts to assess whether those attributes are associated with the aggregate market re-
sponse. Prior literature examining individual firms’ stock price responses to forecasts finds that
bad news and point forecasts are associated with greater stock price responses than good news
and range forecasts, respectively. The former finding is attributed to litigation concerns prompting
3I.e., those firms within the 4-digit SIC code vs. those firms outside the major SIC division, respectively. Please
see http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic manual.html for further detail.
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more timely revelation of bad news and the latter to management employing a forecast range to
indicate the precision of their information. Because we believe the macroeconomic content of a
forecast is unlikely to be significantly tied to forecasting incentives, we expect that similar results
should apply to aggregate market responses to forecasts. Consistent with our expectations, we find
that bad news forecasts and point forecasts are both associated with greater price movements in
the broader market.
Given that macroeconomic uncertainty is priced, the association between forecast news and co-
incident returns that we document could be attributed to changes in uncertainty regarding future
cash flows as well as changes in the expectations of those cash flows. Consequently, we consider
implied volatilities as measured by the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX)
to ascertain whether the forecasts are associated with changes in uncertainty. We find that the
VIX is negatively related to the forecast surprise for firms with high macroeconomic content fore-
casts, which suggests that good (bad) forecast news is associated with a(n) reduction (increase)
in expected future aggregate volatility. Furthermore, we find the magnitude of the VIX change
around management forecasts is larger for bad news than for good news. Hence, it appears that
the macroeconomic information content pertains to uncertainty regarding future cash flows in a
manner consistent with the short window portfolio returns tests (i.e., good news implies less future
volatility, which implies a positive equity price response).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature and Section
3 details our sample selection procedure. Section 4 presents a simple analytical framework and some
preliminary analysis of the macroeconomic information in management forecasts. Section 5 provides
the core of our empirical analysis regarding the timeliness of macroeconomic information conveyed
by management forecasts. Section 6 presents some supplemental analysis prior to concluding in
Section 7.
2 Prior Literature
Anilowski et al. (2007) provide the most pertinent antecedent to this paper. They find aggregate
earnings guidance, particularly downward guidance, is associated with aggregate earnings news and
they present some “weak evidence” that aggregate earnings guidance is associated with monthly
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market returns but not quarterly market returns. In their analysis, they conclude by considering
whether management earnings forecasts by individual bellwether firms, which are defined as large
firms, are associated with movements in aggregate stock prices during the forecast announcement
window, which is directly related to the information event approach adopted in our study. They
provide evidence that qualitative, as opposed to quantitative, guidance for these large firms has an
association with aggregate market returns.
In contrast to aggregate firm forecasts studied by Anilowski et al. (2007), our analysis begins
with a focus on individual firm forecasts. We structure some of our analysis, however, around a
notion consistent with the bellwether firms identified by Anilowski et al. (2007) except we take a
different approach in identifying such firms. In particular, we begin with the premise that some
firms naturally have greater exposure to macroeconomic risk factors and expect that the quanti-
tative guidance provided by such firms will have greater associations with announcement window
market returns than other firms. Our finding regarding the forecasts of firms with higher levels
of macroeconomic information content suggests an avenue for refining the notion of a bellwether
firm. Specifically, Anilowski et al. (2007) find that qualitative disclosures by large firms, which
they refer to as bellwether firms, are associated with disclosure announcement window market re-
turns. One explanation for their finding is that size is a proxy for the macroeconomic information
content in the disclosures. However, we find that firms with forecasts having higher macroeco-
nomic information content tend to be slightly smaller, on average. In addition, incremental to our
macroeconomic information metric, size does not explain the market response to macroeconomic
information contained in the forecasts, which further suggests that size may not adequately proxy
for macroeconomic information content.
Our study also relates to research about intra-industry spillover effects of disclosures.4 The most
related paper in that stream is Baginski (1987), which focuses on intra-industry spillover effects
of management forecasts and finds that forecast surprises for a firm are positively associated with
coincident returns for other firms in the forecasting firm’s industry. While our study focuses on
broader macroeconomic shocks and, accordingly, considers the possibility of inter -industry spillover
effects (Shivakumar, 2010), the intuition underlying our study is analogous to that considered in the
4See, for example, Baginski (1987), Clinch and Sinclair (1987), Foster (1981), Lang and Lundholm (1996), Pownall
and Waymire (1989), and Thomas and Zhang (2008).
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intra-industry spillover literature. For example, an earnings forecast by one firm in an industry may
influence returns of other firms in the same industry because the forecast provides new information
regarding industry-specific events. Our analysis suggests that some of that news involves a broader
information transfer.
Finally, our study is relates to research examining the extent to which the news in aggregate
earnings reflects macroeconomic risks. Some research in this stream of literature, including Camp-
bell (1991) and Vuolteenaho (2002), suggests that the news in earnings may be largely diversifiable,
which would call into question whether individual forecasts of earnings would even have macroe-
conomic information content, while other studies, including Brown and Ball (1967), Fama (1990),
Schwert (1990), Sadka (2007), and Ball et al. (2009), suggest otherwise.5 Within this stream of
literature, the approach taken in our study is perhaps closest to Ball et al. (2009). Similar to one
aspect of that study, we focus on common factors affecting earnings, although we do so by ex-ante
identifying observable proxies for common factors in the spirit of Chen et al. (1986) whereas they use
principal components analysis to empirically derive common earnings factors. More importantly,
our study, which focuses on the macroeconomic information content of individual disclosures, as
opposed to whether earnings risk is systematic and priced, adds to the insights in that literature by
demonstrating that some of the macroeconomic news contained in earnings is revealed in a timely
manner through management forecasts.
3 Sample
We conduct our primary analysis using a sample of 16,824 firm-quarters (974 firms) over the period
2001 – 2008. The sample period corresponds to the increased availability in the early 2000s of
management forecast data from Thomson Financial’s Company Issued Guidance (CIG) database
and the period following the passage of Regulation FD. We obtain market return data from CRSP,
VIX data from the CBOE, and firm financial information from Compustat. We retain the first
quarterly earnings forecast from the CIG database made in quarter t for quarter t+1. To estimate
our proxy for macroeconomic information content, we require at least ten quarterly observations
5Indeed, Ball et al. (2009) state that “...the two components of price, returns and cash flows, may be jointly driven
by common economic factors” and, given the high correlation between cash flow risk and return risk “...it may not
be feasible to identify separate effects of cash flow news and returns news.”
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per firm. After matching analyst earnings forecast data to management forecast data and requiring
at least one analyst forecast to calculate earnings surprise, we arrive at our final sample.
Some of our empirical analysis requires that we characterize either the realization or expectation
of the macroeconomic state. To do so we adopt an approach similar to that used by Chen et al.
(1986) and employ various macroeconomic statistics as proxies for the macroeconomic factors (i.e.,
M in the analytical framework) characterizing the macroeconomic state.6 Specifically, we employ
the following variables as proxies: Moody’s Aaa corporate bond yield (BOND), the consumer
price index inflation rate (CPI), housing starts (HOUSING), the index of industrial production
(INDPROD), real gross domestic product (RGDP), the three-month treasury bill rate (TBILL),
the ten-year treasury bond rate (TBOND), and the unemployment rate (UNEMP). These data are
obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters. We
use the forecasts made in the quarter prior to the announcement date for the current quarter and
the first vintage available for the realizations.
4 Preliminary Analysis
To provide some structural motivation, we begin by presenting a simple analytical framework that
provides insight into how we interpret the findings of our preliminary empirical analysis on the
macroeconomic information in management forecasts. We then discuss how we identify firms with
management forecasts that have high macroeconomic information content relative to those of other
firms. Finally, we compare the characteristics of firms with high macroeconomic information content
forecasts to those of other forecasting firms.
4.1 Analytical Framework
Consider a firm whose earnings, e, are determined by macroeconomic factor realizations and a
firm-specific shock realization:
e = μe + B′M + m (1)
6The approach used by Chen et al. (1986) to study the relationship between macroeconomic variables and stock
returns has also been adopted by other researchers. See Christofferson et al. (2002), Flannery and Protopapadakis
(2002), and Liu and Zhang (2008) for examples.
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where μe is a constant, M is a vector of macroeconomic factor realizations, B is the sensitivity
of the firm’s earnings to the macroeconomic factor, and m represents the impact of firm-specific
shocks on earnings. B′M and m are mean 0 independent normally distributed random variables
with respective variances V and v. Management privately obtains some information about e that
is represented by the realization of a random variable y, where y is normally distributed with
mean 0, variance s, and covariances with B′M and m of C and c respectively. We represent
management’s information with one aggregate statistic to reflect the idea that management observes
events that are potentially influenced by both macroeconomic and firm-specific outcomes. For
example, management may observe an unexpected increase in sales orders, which could be due in
part to macroeconomic demand effects and/or firm-specific sales force effects.
The manager’s forecasting strategy, f , is assumed to be linear in his information y:
f = μf + by + n, (2)
where μf is a constant, b is a constant, and n is a normally distributed random variable with
mean 0 and variance σ that is independent of all other random variables. Note that we have not
constrained the manager’s forecast to be his expectation of earnings, which is not required for the
forecast to be informative. If the manager’s forecast equals his expectation of earnings, however,
the forecast parameters equal μf = μe, b = C+cs , and the variance of n, σ, is zero (i.e., n = 0).
If the manager’s forecast is biased (deviates from the statistical expectation), the unconditional
expected bias equals μf − μe, and the bias conditional upon y and n is μf − μe +
(
b− C+cs
)
y + n.
4.2 Empirical Framework
Our empirical approach for identifying the extent to which a firm’s forecasts reflect macroeconomic
factor realizations stems directly from our analytic framework. We first decompose earnings into two
components by regressing firms’ earnings realizations on a proxy vector, Mˆ , for the macroeconomic
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factor realizations, M , to obtain estimates of μe, B and m, which are denoted μˆe, Bˆ and mˆ:7
e = μˆe + Bˆ′Mˆ + mˆ (3)
Within the context of our analytical framework, the R2 from this regression, which we define
as R2e , proxies for V/(V + v) and represents the proportion of earnings variation attributable to
macroeconomic factor realizations.
Next, we use Mˆ and the estimates for B′M and m derived in the first regression, Bˆ′Mˆ and
mˆ respectively, to run a second regression to determine the extent to which forecasts contain
information about the macroeconomic state:
f = μˆf + ΓBˆ′Mˆ + γmˆ + η, (4)
where η is the error term. Within the context of our analytical modeling framework, μˆf is our
estimate of μf , Γ is our estimate of bCV , γ is our estimate of b
c
v , and the variance of η is σ +
b2
(
s− C2V − c
2
v
)
. Not surprisingly, the conceptual constructs reflected in the coefficients Γ and γ,
bCV and b
c
v respectively, reflect the nature of the manager’s information, which is captured by
C
V
and cv , as well as how the manager impounds that information into his forecast, which is captured
by b. If the manager’s information can be represented as earnings plus noise and his forecast is
unbiased, then Γ = γ.
We utilize semi-partial R2 statistics from the regression of the form in (4) to gain some in-
sights about the extent to which forecasts reflect macroeconomic information.8 The semi-partial
R2, or partial R2 for short, for the macroeconomic component in regression (4), r2s , proxies for
b2C2/V
(
b2s + σ
)
in our analytic framework and reflects the proportion of forecast variation that
can be explained by the macroeconomic shock realizations. Similarly, the partial R2 for the firm-
specific component, r2i , proxies for b
2c2/v
(
b2s + σ
)
. A larger partial R2 for a component of earnings
suggests that the forecast contains more information about that earnings component.
7In the spirit of the analysis employed by Ball et al. (2009), an alternative approach to our decomposition is to
employ factor analysis to identify common macroeconomic factors of earnings. Please see the Appendix for detail on
the alternative implementation, which yields similar inferences.
8A convenient property of the semi -partial R2 is that it is additive whereas the partial R2 could lead to cases
where r2s + r
2
i > R
2.
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We also attempt to determine whether, on average, the information impounded into forecasts is
more or less heavily weighted towards macroeconomic factors than the earnings being forecast. For
example, managers might be expected to know more about firm-specific events than macroeconomic
events and that their forecasts would reflect that weighting. To ascertain whether management
forecasts reflect macroeconomic news to a greater or lesser degree than the earnings itself, we
compute the statistic r2s/r
2
i − R2e/(1 − R2e), which captures the forecast variation explained by
the macroeconomic factor realizations relative to that explained the firm-specific shocks less the
analogous ratio for earnings itself. If this value is positive (negative), it suggests that more of the
information impounded into the manager’s forecast is macroeconomic (firm-specific) relative to the
impact of macroeconomic shocks on earnings. Within the context of our analytical framework,
r2s/r
2
i − R2e/(1 − R2e) is expected to be 0 if the manager’s information, y, can be represented as
earnings plus noise, which is a theoretical specification of private information often employed in
the literature.
4.3 Extracting Information Content
For each firm, we first run regression (3) of earnings on the macroeconomic proxies to obtain
estimates of Bˆ and mˆ. Within the context of our analytical framework, the R2 from this regression,
R2e , proxies for the underlying value of V/(V + v) in the analytic framework. The mean (median)
R2 is 77% (82%), suggesting that macroeconomic factors are significant drivers of firm earnings,
which is consistent with the principal component analysis in Ball et al. (2009).
To provide a measure of the amount of macroeconomic information in individual forecasts, we
run regression (4) for each firm, which is a regression of each firm’s forecasts on the estimates of
the firm’s macroeconomic and firm-specific components of its earnings, Bˆ′Mˆ , and mˆ respectively.
The partial R2 for the macroeconomic component in regression (4), r2s , reflects the macroeconomic
information content of the forecast and the partial R2 for the firm-specific component, r2i , reflects
the firm-specific information content. The mean (median) r2s for these regressions is 51% (54%) and
the mean (median) r2i is 16% (10%). Hence, this evidence suggests that macroeconomic information
is impounded into management forecasts in addition to firm-specific information.
Given that the events managers privately observe (e.g., sales orders) are almost surely in-
fluenced by macroeconomic factor realizations, it is hardly surprising that information regarding
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macroeconomic factor realizations is impounded into management earnings forecasts. What is
less clear is whether the information underlying the manager’s forecast is more weighted towards
macroeconomic or firm-specific risk factors relative to what one might expect given the relative
impacts of macroeconomic and firm-specific shocks on earnings. Hence, we compute the value
r2s/r
2
i − R2e/(1 − R2e) which, as discussed above, is positive (negative) if more of the information
in the forecasts is macroeconomic (firm-specific) relative to the impact of macroeconomic shocks
on earnings. On the other hand, if the value is 0, it suggests that the information underlying the
forecast can be reflected as earnings plus noise.
A histogram of the differences between the estimates of r2s/r
2
i − R2e/(1− R2e) for the sample is
presented in Figure 1, with the tails truncated to eliminate the bottom and top 10% of values. We
truncate the distribution because some of the estimates of r2i and 1−R2e are very close to 0, which
drives extreme values in the tails. The mean (median) difference of the truncated distribution is
2.74 (0.22) and is statistically significant at the 1% (10%) level. An interpretation of the statistic is
that the data may suggest forecasts impound somewhat more information regarding macroeconomic
shock realizations than is impounded in the underlying earnings.
4.4 High vs. Low Macroeconomic Information
Some firms’ forecasts might naturally be expected to reflect macroeconomic shocks to a greater
degree than other firms’ forecasts because of the more cyclical nature of some businesses. For
example, the demand for company A’s product or service could be more more sensitive to the state
of the macroeconomy than the demand for company B’s product or service. As a consequence, a
forecast from company A, which is based in part on its advance order flows, would reflect more
macroeconomic information that a forecast from company B, which is based in part on its advance
order flows. We employ a data-driven approach to measure the extent to which a company’s forecast
reflects macroeconomic news by using the semi-partial R2 for the macroeconomic component in
regression (4), r2s . A histogram of the values of r
2
s is provided in Figure 2, which illustrates
that some companies issue forecasts with more macroeconomic information content than others.
The correlation between r2s and R
2
e is 0.425 and statistically significant, suggesting that firms
whose earnings are impacted to a greater degree by macroeconomic shocks tend to have more
macroeconomic information in their earnings forecasts.
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In our subsequent analysis, firms with an r2s in the upper quartile are classified as high macroe-
conomic information content firms, or high macro firms for short, and the remainder are low
macroeconomic information content firms, or low macro firms for short. Panels B and C of Table 1
provide some descriptive information for high and low macro firms. High macro firms tend to be
concentrated in the manufacturing, retail, and services industries, although there is a great deal
of overlap between the industries containing high and low macro firms. Furthermore, high macro
firms are smaller on average than the low macro firms as measured by assets, sales, or market
capitalization. The means and medians of the earnings surprise (ANALYST SURP) and the earn-
ings guidance surprise (CIG SURP) are insignificantly different from 0, suggesting that the central
tendency of the news conveyed by management forecasts and actual earnings is neither good nor
bad.
Although we make no explicit predictions about how forecast attributes should differ by the
macroeconomic information content of the forecast, management forecasts are more conservative
(negative forecast errors) and accurate (lower absolute forecast error dispersion) for high macro
firms. Based on untabulated results, high macro firms have a mean signed forecast error of -
0.013 compared to 0.039 for low macro firms, where signed forecast error is computed as forecast
minus actual. This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. High macro firms have a
mean absolute forecast error of 0.047 compared to 0.099 for low macro firms. This difference is
also statistically significant at the 1% level. To determine whether these relationships explain our
primary findings, we conduct supplementary analysis related to forecast characteristics later in the
paper.
5 Management Forecast Timeliness
If disclosure influences the cost of capital by informing market participants about macroeconomic
risk factor realizations, it should provide timely (i.e., new) information to the market regarding
those realizations. While the descriptive analysis above suggests that management forecasts contain
information about the macroeconomic state, it provides little evidence that the information is
timely. Our primary tests of timeliness are short-window event study tests using equity market
data. In those tests, we examine how market portfolio returns are associated with surprises in
12
management forecasts during the forecast announcement window. In addition to first moments
(i.e., means) of beliefs, we examine second moments (i.e., variances), given that forecast surprises
may convey such information.
Although short window tests of the form we construct can provide reasonably compelling ev-
idence regarding timeliness, we acknowledge that these tests provide less compelling evidence of
causality. Because of the sheer daily volume of disclosures by news organizations, business commen-
tators, executives, and governmental officials, we attempt to address concurrent disclosure issues
in supplemental analysis.
5.1 Equity Market Tests
We conduct short-window regression analyses to test for an association between an individual firm’s
forecast surprise and the market portfolio return, excluding the return of the forecasting firm,
around the release of the forecast. Approximately 80% of the forecasts in our sample are bundled
with earnings. Because bundled forecasts are more likely to arise as a matter of predictable firm
policy whereas unbundled forecasts are more likely to arise as a matter of information arrival, the
average responses to the two types of forecasts are likely to differ. Furthermore, in the case of
bundled forecasts, we must control for the coincident earnings release whereas there is no such
release to control for with an unbundled forecast. For these two reasons, we run separate regression
analyses for the bundled and unbundled forecasts. For the bundled forecasts, we estimate the
following regression:
CRi,t = α + β1CIG SURPi,t + β2ANALY ST SURPi,t + β3BONDt−1 + β4CPIt−1 (5)
+ β5HOUSINGt−1 + β6INDPRODt−1 + β7RGDPt−1 + β8TBILLt−1
+ β9TBONDt−1 + β10UNEMPt−1 + εi,t
where CRi,t is the cumulative value-weighted market return excluding firm i over the t days
surrounding the release of the management forecast, CIG SURPi,t equals the actual guidance
given by management (CIG ACTUAL) less the estimated consensus analyst forecast, and ANA-
LYST SURPi,t, is the realized earnings (EARN ACTUAL) less the most recent analyst consensus
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prior to the announcement date scaled by beginning of quarter price.9 We incorporate macroeco-
nomic time series (MTS) forecasts provided by the Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) of Philadelphia
prior to the management forecasts in order to control for an aggregate return risk premium (Cready
and Gurun, 2010). For the unbundled forecasts we run the same regression excluding the ANA-
LYST SURPi,t variable.
Value-weighted returns are employed in regression (5) because we believe value-weighted returns
are more reflective of the aggregate macroeconomic state due to the fact that larger firms naturally
comprise a greater portion of the total macroeconomy. Similar results, however, are obtained when
we use equal-weighted returns.
Because of coincident information events (i.e., other management earnings forecasts released
in the same time horizon), overlapping windows present a challenge for our analysis. During
our sample period, on days when at least one firm provides earnings guidance, the mean (median)
number of firms providing earnings guidance on that day is 9.58 (5.00). Thus, as a consequence, εi,t
in regression (5) will be correlated across observations. To mitigate the problem of this dependence
in the error term, we cluster regression standard errors by firm and forecast announcement quarter.
In supplemental tests, we also cluster standard errors by forecast month, week, and day and obtain
similar results. Because of the coincidence of forecasts, in supplemental analysis, we examine the
sensitivity of our primary results to: (1) the inclusion of overlapping forecasting firms’ returns
in the market portfolio, and (2) forecasts made during earnings guidance “seasons” during which
many firms provide earnings forecasts in a concentrated period of time.
We predict the coefficient on CIG SURPi,t to be positive if forecasts contain timely informa-
tion about macroeconomic risks. Inherent to our test is an additional hypothesis that firms are
predominantly pro-cyclical. If, say, half of the firms are counter-cyclical (i.e., β1 < 0) and half are
pro-cyclical (β1 > 0), our test is misspecified and would likely suggest that the forecasts do not
contain timely macroeconomic information content. Our prior beliefs regarding the predominance
of pro-cyclical firms is driven by market return findings in Anilowski et al. (2007) regarding qual-
itative management forecasts as well as the intra-industry findings in Baginski (1987) regarding
management forecasts.
We run regression (5) over three return windows: a three-day window (-1,+1), a five-day window
9We also use total assets as an alternative scalar and find similar results.
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(-1,+3), and a twelve-day window (-1,+10). Given our interest in the timeliness of forecasts, we
place our emphasis on the shortest window and employ multiple windows to corroborate our findings
in the shortest window. Table 2 provides the results from regressions of the form in equation
(5). Consistent with our expectations, we find a statistically significant positive relation between
bundled earnings guidance news, CIG SURP, and aggregate equity market returns for all return
windows (-1 to +1, -1 to +3, -1 to +10) surrounding the guidance release. The coefficients of
0.796, 1.546, and 3.470 imply, on average, that aggregate market returns increase by 0.02%, 0.04%,
and 0.09%, respectively, as the news in firms’ management forecasts increases by one standard
deviation.10 Although small in magnitude compared with response coefficients from firm-specific
studies, our results appear to be economically meaningful in the context of an individual firm’s
influence on the broader equity market.
While the results in Table 2 suggest that earnings guidance in bundled forecasts provide timely
information to the broader stock market, we find little evidence that unbundled guidance provides
similar timely macroeconomic information, which is consistent with unbundled guidance being
driven by more idiosyncratic negative shocks to individual firms. In Table 2, only the coefficient
on CIG SURP for the (-1,+1) window is statistically significant at conventional levels, and it is
only at the 0.10 level. One possible explanation for the weak results for unbundled forecasts is
that these forecast surprises are attributable to one-time events that are primarily firm specific in
nature and, as a consequence, have little macroeconomic news whereas routine bundled forecasts
tend to reflect underlying cyclical macroeconomic events. Consistent with this conjecture, we find
that the r2s (r
2
i ) from regression (4) is statistically higher (lower) for bundled forecasts compared
to unbundled forecasts. The values of rss (r
2
i ) for bundled and unbundled forecasts are 0.505 and
0.487 (0.175 and 0.189) respectively. We generally find no statistically significant evidence related
to unbundled forecasts in any subsequent analyses, and therefore restrict our analysis to bundled
forecasts for the remainder of the paper.
It should be noted that the coefficients on the earnings surprise, ANALYST SURPi,t, in the
10Table 2 reveals an increase in the magnitude of our estimated coefficient on CIG SURP as our estimation window
lengthens from (-1,+1) to (-1,+10), which could be consistent with the results found by Cohen and Frazzini (2008)
that indicate it takes some time for the market to impound news about related firms. While we employed multiple
announcement windows for the sake of corroborating our base results, the apparent increase in the magnitude of
the market reaction to earnings guidance news is unexpected. However, as noted later in the paper, the pattern of
increasing coefficients observed in the base sample disappears in the out-of-sample analysis.
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regressions involving bundled forecasts exhibit no consistent statistically significant relation, which
is also the case in some subsequent analysis as well. Thus, firm-level earnings surprise does not
appear to convey timely information about macroeconomic news. As discussed by Rogers and Van
Buskirk (2012), however, the observation that earnings exhibits no statistically significant relation
with returns should not be interpreted as implying that the earnings surprise would also appear
incrementally uninformative if no guidance were provided, nor should the coefficient on the earnings
guidance surprise, CIG SURPi,t, be interpreted as capturing the incremental information content
of the forecast over and above the earnings. Since the management forecast may incorporate the
concurrently released earnings surprise, the forecast surprise could subsume the earnings surprise
as long as the forecast also contains information over and above earnings.
Regardless of Rogers and Van Buskirk’s (2012) observation, the forecast surprise in regression
(5) would not load if the forecast did not contain macroeconomic information beyond that con-
tained in earnings. Hence, the test is still a valid assessment of whether the forecast contains
timely macroeconomic information. The coefficients, however, must be carefully interpreted (i.e.,
conditioned on observing both the forecast and earnings). In supplemental analysis, we employ
the procedure proposed by Rogers and Van Buskirk (2012) in an effort to isolate the incremental
information content of the forecast beyond that in the concurrent earnings release.
5.1.1 Bellwether Firms
If a manager’s forecast conveys a large amount of macroeconomic information and is timely, the
manager’s firm is likely to be viewed as a bellwether firm because the manager’s forecast has
significant timely information regarding the future performance of other firms. We have empirically
identified firms with more macroeconomic information in their forecasts, high macro firms, and we
expect these firms’ forecasts to be as timely as other firms’ forecasts. Accordingly, we expect high
macro firms to be bellwether firms and, as a consequence, anticipate that their forecasts will have a
greater association with market returns around the forecast announcement date. To assess whether
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high macro firms are bellwether firms, we run stacked regressions of the form:
CRi,t = HI MACROIND=1(α + β1CIG SURPi,t +
∑
γCONTROLS + εi,t) (6)
+ HI MACROIND=0(α + β1CIG SURPi,t +
∑
γCONTROLS + εi,t)
where HI MACROIND=1 is an indicator variable that takes on the value of 1 if firm i has a
partial R2 associated with macroeconomic shocks in the upper quartile of r2s from regression (4)
and is 0 otherwise, HI MACROIND=0 is an indicator variable that takes on the value of 1 if
firm i has a partial R2 associated with macroeconomic shocks in the lower three quartiles of r2s
and is 0 otherwise, and CONTROLS refers to all the control variables employed in regression
(6). If bellwether firms are defined by the macroeconomic information in their forecasts, we expect
β1 > 0 where HI MACROIND=1. Further, if high macro firm forecasts convey more macroeconomic
information, we expect β1 to be greater when HI MACROIND=1 than when HI MACROIND=0.
Table 3 presents results of regression (6). Consistent with our expectations, β1 is statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level for all return windows (-1 to +1, -1 to +3, -1 to +10) where
HI MACROIND=1. The coefficients of 1.477, 2.488, and 5.045 imply, on average, that aggregate
market returns increase by 0.04%, 0.07%, and 0.14%, respectively, as the news in firms’ manage-
ment forecasts increases by one standard deviation. F-tests reveal that the differences between
β1 where HI MACROIND=1 and HI MACROIND=0 are statistically significant at the 5% level for
the -1 to +1 return window, and 10% level for the longer windows, which is consistent with our
prediction that high macro firms are bellwether firms. In fact, β1 is never statistically different from
zero in Table 3 for any of the return windows where HI MACROIND=0. Thus, bundled earnings
forecasts appear to convey significant timely information about macroeconomic news only for firms
whose forecasts have a greater association with macroeconomic factors.
As also shown in Table 2, the coefficient on ANALYST SURP in the Table 3 regressions is
generally statistically insignificant. However, in the (-1,+10) window, the coefficient on ANA-
LYST SURP is 2.274 for high macro firms, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. This
result is consistent with firm-level earnings surprise conveying some timely information about ag-
gregate cash flow news, based on the positive coefficient.
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5.1.2 Proximity
We have established that high macro firms’ forecasts have timely macroeconomic information con-
tent. The exact nature of the macroeconomic information content in those forecasts could be due
to either the forecast reflecting broad economy-wide news pertaining to the performance of almost
all firms or, alternatively, narrower industry specific news pertaining to the performance of a mea-
surable set of firms in the market portfolio, which would still make it an undiversifiable news event.
As an illustrative example, assume an economy with two industries, A and B, where A relies heavily
on an imported commodity product as an input and B does not. If there is a supply disruption for
the commodity due to, say, a simmering regional conflict, industry A is adversely affected and the
equity prices of industry A firms decline when there is news signalling the supply chain disruption.
If the economy is sufficiently “closed,” then B may be adversely affected as well because consumers
whose income is adversely affected by the shock to A will not demand as much of B’s product. In
this case, then, news about the supply chain disruption would be associated with declines in the
equity prices of firms in both A and B. Within the context of the analytic framework, this scenario
would imply the relevant coefficient in the vector B would be nonzero and of the same sign for firms
in both industries. Alternatively, if the economy is sufficiently “open” so the demand for industry
B’s product is unaffected by the shock to A’s supply chain, then B’s equity price would not be
affected by the shock to industry A’s supply chain. Within the context of the analytic framework,
the relevant coefficient in vector B would be 0 for firms in industry B.
To determine whether the macroeconomic information captured in the forecasts of high macro
firms reflects broad economy-wide or narrower industry-specific news, we run stacked regressions
of the form in equation (3) for firms in the same four-digit SIC as the forecasting firm and those
outside of the forecasting firm’s SIC division. The results of these regressions are presented in
Table 4. Across all three return windows, management forecasts have a statistically significant
association with the aggregate returns of firms inside the forecasting firm’s four-digit SIC and
outside its SIC division category. The returns of firms within the same 4-digit SIC increase, on
average, by approximately 0.14%, 0.22%, and 0.39% per standard deviation increase in CIG SURP
across our three announcement windows. For firms outside the SIC division of a forecasting firm,
the announcement period returns average 0.03%, 0.05%, and 0.11% per standard deviation increase
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in CIG SURP respectively. Thus, the forecasts contain information regarding both industry-wide
and economy-wide news. Further, the magnitude of the reaction is larger for firms within the same
four-digit SIC, suggesting that the information regarding industry-wide news is greater than that
related to economy-wide news. F-tests of the differences in the coefficients on CIG SURP between
the two industry groupings are statistically different at 1% level for the (-1,+1) and (-1,+3) windows
and at the 5% level for the (-1,+10) window.
With respect to our earnings surprise variable, ANALYST SURP, we find some evidence that
industry portfolio returns react positively to firm-level earnings news with coefficients of 1.377,
3.831, and 6.782 (1.567, 3.887, and 6.757) for the regressions without (with) macroeconomic time
series controls, all statistically significant at the 10% level or better. Accordingly, the result only
found in the (-1,+10) window in Table 3 appears in all three Table 4 return windows for the
within industry portfolio returns, suggesting that the “aggregate” cash flow news found in firm-
level earnings surprises relates to industry cash flows news rather than overall market cash flows
news, which is consistent with the findings of Choi et al. (2012). Finally, although we find some
evidence that firm-level earnings news provides timely information about industry cash flows, the
magnitude of the market return association is only a fraction of that in relation to the management
forecast surprise. In the (-1,+1) window, the industry portfolio association is almost four times as
much for a particular unit of forecast surprise as it does for the same unit of earnings surprise. For
the other two return windows, the market return association with guidance surprise is more than
twice as large as the return association with earnings surprise. Consistent with recent firm-level
evidence (Ball and Shivakumar (2008), Beyer et al. (2010), and Milian (2010)), guidance surprise
appears to convey more information to broader equity prices than earnings surprise.
5.1.3 Forecast Attributes
Prior research has shown that a forecasting firm’s stock price response is larger when the forecast
news is bad and when the forecast range is narrower.11 A rationale offered for the former finding
pertaining to the direction of the forecast news is that litigation and reputation concerns induce
11See Hutton et al. (2003), Skinner (1994), and Soffer et al. (2000) for examples documenting the asymmetric
stock market response to good news and bad news management earnings forecasts. Also, see Baginski et al. (1993)
and Pownall et al. (1993) for examples of studies documenting stronger stock market reactions to point versus range
management earnings forecasts.
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firm management to reveal bad news in a more timely manner than good news. Hence, good news
forecasts are relatively less timely on average and, accordingly, are associated with a smaller stock
price response during the forecast announcement window. We do not expect the litigation incentives
to be strongly associated with the macroeconomic content of forecasts because firm management
can be sued only by those with direct claims on the firm and those potential plaintiffs’ claims would
not be tied to the macroeconomic content of the news. We therefore expect bad news forecasts
to provide more timely revelations of firms’ macroeconomic news relative to equivalent good news
forecasts.
The rationale for the second finding pertaining to the forecast range is that management uses
the forecast range to signal the precision of information underlying the forecast. The rationale
refers to precision regarding the earnings realization as opposed to precision regarding the macroe-
conomic component of earnings. We anticipate, however, that a more precise signal of earnings is a
more precise signal of both of its components. Consequently, we expect that high macro forecasts
involving a narrower forecast range will be associated with a larger market response.
To test the two conjectures regarding the attributes of the forecast and the equity market
response, we run two regressions of the form:
CRi,t = ATTRIND=1(α + β1CIG SURPi,t +
∑
γCONTROLS + εi,t) (7)
+ ATTRIND=0(α + β1CIG SURPi,t +
∑
γCONTROLS + εi,t)
where ATTR ∈ {POS SURP,POINT } and POS SURP is a binary variable set equal to one if
a firm’s earnings guidance exceeds analysts’ consensus estimate immediately prior to the guidance
release and zero otherwise and POINT is a binary variable set equal to one if a firm’s earnings
guidance is a point estimate and zero if it is a range. If our conjectures are correct, we expect
the coefficients on CIG SURP for bad news and point forecasts to be more positive than the
corresponding coefficients for good news and range forecasts.
We present our estimation of regression (7) for each attribute type in Table 5. As shown in
Panel A, consistent with our expectations for aggregate stock returns and with prior studies on
firm-specific equity market reactions to earnings guidance, we document a more pronounced relation
between the market return and the guidance for bad news. For a one standard deviation increase
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in guidance news, we estimate that the aggregate equity market responds by 0.75% more for bad
news forecasts than good news forecasts in the (-1,+1) window around guidance releases. In the
(-1,+3) window around guidance releases, this difference is approximately 1.36% on average. For
both windows, F-tests of the difference in CIG SURP across good and bad news partitions are
statistically significant at the 5% level for the (-1,+1) and (-1,+3) windows. We do not, however,
find a statistically significant difference across the partition for the (-1,+10) window. Overall, the
evidence in Panel A of Table 5 is consistent with prior firm-specific research and our expectations
regarding macroeconomic information content insofar as bad news guidance is more timely and/or
credible than good news guidance for high macro firms.
Turning to Panel B of Table 5, we present our results for the estimation of regression (7) related
to point versus range earnings guidance. Again, consistent with prior research and our expectations,
we find a more pronounced aggregate stock market response to point compared to range forecasts. In
our primary announcement period window of (-1,+1), a one standard deviation increase in guidance
news is associated with 0.86% higher aggregate stock return for point forecasters compared with
range forecasters. An F-test of the difference in coefficients on CIG SURP between the point
and range partitions is statistically significant at the 10% level. Our other announcement period
windows of (-1,+3) and (-1,+10) reveal similar inferences with 1.14% and 2.39% higher aggregate
stock returns per one standard deviation of guidance news respectively. These differences across
the partitions are also statistically different at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively, based on the
F-tests found in Table 5. Again, consistent with prior firm-specific research and our expectations
regarding macroeconomic information content, the results in Panel B of Table 5 suggest that more
precise point forecasts are associated with greater stock price movements than range forecasts.
5.2 Market Volatility
Research on “volatility feedback” (Black, 1976; Christie, 1982; Campbell and Hentschel, 1992;
French et al., 1987; Wu, 2001) shows that overall stock market volatility is generally higher after
stock prices fall than after they rise. If the movements in stock prices are associated with the disclo-
sures released to the market, then this empirical observation suggests bad news might be associated
with increases in volatility and good news associated with decreases in volatility. Consistent with
this reasoning, Kim et al. (2012) find that market wide volatility is negatively associated with prior
21
aggregate guidance provided to the market and Rogers et al. (2009) show that implied volatilities
derived from traded option prices for a given firm are negatively associated with news conveyed by
management forecasts for that firm.
If individual firms’ earnings guidance conveys macroeconomic information, a similar relation
between market-wide volatility and individual firm guidance is plausible for two reasons. First, poor
performance at the macroeconomic level implies that, on average, firms become more levered, which
makes the future cash flows for equity claims more sensitive to future performance. As a consequence
of this leverage effect on the uncertainty of cash flows accruing to equity holders, future stock price
volatility increases when current performance is poor because equity prices become more sensitive
to future reported performance (Black, 1976; Christie, 1982; Campbell and Hentschel, 1992; French
et al., 1987; Wu, 2001). If, therefore, individual firm forecasts contain timely macroeconomic news
pertaining to the performance of many or all firms, we expect that news to be associated with
changes in market wide volatility due to the leverage effect.
Second, the direction of the macroeconomic news in an earnings forecast could also convey
information regarding the volatility of underlying macroeconomic fundamentals.12 In particular,
greater (lower) fundamental volatility could naturally cause individuals to be more cautious (as-
sertive) in their investing and consumption activities, which implies lower (greater) earnings and,
hence, earnings forecasts. As a consequence, the earnings forecasts would convey information about
the evolution of the volatility of macroeconomic fundamentals. If fundamental volatility is associ-
ated with equity price volatility, then we expect a relation between individual firm forecast news
and equity price volatility.
We test this conjectured link between individual firm forecasts and market wide volatility by
assessing whether the news in management forecasts is associated with changes in the Chicago
Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) during short announcement period windows.13 In
12In studying the relation between economic policy uncertainty and future economic fluctuations, Baker et al.
(2012) find that increases in their constructed index of policy-related economic uncertainty foreshadow declines in
real GDP, private investment, and aggregate employment.
13Kim et al. (2012) use the VIX to examine the association between overall market uncertainty and both the
decision to issue management earnings guidance and the characteristics of earnings guidance.
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particular, we run regressions of the following form:
ΔV IX−t,+t = POS SURPIND=1(α + β1CIG SURPi,t +
∑
γCONTROLS + εi,t) (8)
+ POS SURPIND=1(α + β1CIG SURPi,t +
∑
γCONTROLS + εi,t)
where ΔV IX−t,+t is the change in the VIX in the t days surrounding the forecast announcement
and POS SURP is 1 if the guidance surprise is positive and 0 otherwise. We have allowed the
relation to be asymmetric because of the likelihood that bad news forecasts are more timely than
good news forecasts, which would suggest that the association within the forecast event window
will be more pronounced for bad news.
The results of our estimation of regression (8) can be found in Table 6. As documented in
Table 6, there is evidence of a negative association between CIG SURP and changes in VIX for
both good news and bad news forecasts; although the former is more statistically significant, the
latter is more economically significant. For the (-1,0) window, only good news guidance appears
to have a statistically significant effect on the VIX (β1 = −1.485; significant at the 1% level
without macroeconomic time series controls and β1 = −1.174; significant at the 1% level with
macroeconomic time series controls), but for the (-1,+1) window both bad new and good news
forecasts exhibit a statistically significant association with changes in the VIX. For good news
guidance, β1 is statistically significant at the 1% level, while for bad news guidance, β1 is significant
at the 10% level. We conduct F-tests of the differences between β1 for bad news guidance and good
news guidance. Focusing on the results for regressions with macroeconomic time series controls,
our results imply a 2.54 basis point decrease in the VIX for every one standard deviation increase
in guidance surprise for good news guidance and 116.12 basis point increase in the VIX for every
one standard deviation decrease in guidance surprise for bad new guidance. Thus, guidance news
for bad news forecasts is associated with fairly economically significant change in the market’s
perceptions of future volatility.
Finally, note that the relation between guidance news and changes in volatility dovetail nicely
with the relation between guidance news and equity market returns. Because macroeconomic
uncertainty is priced, greater uncertainty should be associated with price declines and vice versa.
Because the guidance news is negatively related to market uncertainty, we would expect market
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returns to be positively related to guidance news.
6 Supplemental Tests
Our last set of analyses consists of supplemental tests to shed light on whether our findings have
been substantially influenced by disclosure bunching, misspecification of the forecast surprise for
bundled forecasts, or our particular approach for measuring the macroeconomic information content
in firms’ forecasts. In addition, we consider whether controlling for two firm attributes, size and
forecast accuracy and pessimism, alter the empirical relations identified previously in the paper.
Finally, we assess whether our results are attributable to forecasts during particular time periods.
6.1 Disclosure Bunching
As discussed earlier, individual forecasts are not the only disclosures occurring during a forecast
announcement window and the associations we document could arise from a forecast having news
that is correlated with the news in other concurrent disclosures. Since we cannot rule out this
possibility, we conduct some supplemental analysis to assess whether it is a primary driver of the
associations we document.
6.1.1 Forecast Bunching
For the vast majority of our forecasts, there are multiple coincident forecasts occurring on the
same date. We have used two-dimensional clustered standard errors in our regressions by firm and
quarter to address the issue of correlated error terms. Because a quarter might not be the relevant
time dimension upon which to cluster, however, we also re-estimate our primary regressions (5) and
(6) to assess whether clustering by day, week, or month alters our insights. Regardless of which
time dimension is used for clustering, we obtain similar findings.
While clustering can alleviate the issue of correlated errors, it may still be the case that bunches
of forecasts occurring in any return window could be a driver of our results. For example, if enough
firms forecast in the same return window, there is some possibility our results could arise because
of correlation in those forecasts. In other words, the market response arises because of coincident
forecasts as opposed to broad spillovers, which is the premise of the argument made by Anilowski
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et al. (2007) who argue that the pervasiveness of earnings guidance should make it more informative
to the market as a whole. We take two approaches to assess whether our results in Table 3 may be
attributable to forecast bunching.
First, we re-run our primary regressions, but exclude the returns of all firms providing earnings
guidance from the market portfolio in any given return window from the computation of CRit.
During the time period covered by our sample, in any given 12-day period (the length of time
covered by our (-1,+10) announcement period window), there are a maximum of 411 firms providing
forecasts. This number represents approximately 5.9% of the average 6,932 firms included in the
market portfolio per CRSP. However, the mean (median) number of unique forecasts in any given 12-
day span is significantly lower at 99 (60), which represents approximately 1.4% (0.9%) of the average
number of firms included in the market portfolio. Thus, we do not expect the removal of coincident
forecasters’ returns from the market portfolio return to materially affect our inferences. Consistent
with these expectations, the coefficients on CIG SURP in these regressions using this modified
estimate of the aggregate market return exhibit the same magnitudes and levels of statistical
significance as found in Table 3, which suggests that the associations we document are not solely
driven by correlations in the returns of coincident guidance providers.
Second, we assess whether our results are driven solely by forecasts occurring during periods of
intense forecast bunching (i.e., periods of time when there are many concurrent forecasts), which
could occur if each individual forecast in an announcement window is correlated with the others
in that same window and each has small spillover effects to a few other firms in the market. In
particular, under these conditions, we could find an association between an individual forecast
and the market return even if concurrent forecasts are eliminated from CRit because of the small
spillover effects associated with many concurrent forecasts. Within our sample, forecast frequencies
vary substantially throughout the year, with the most dense periods of forecast bunching occurring
at the end of January, April, July, and October. Given that observation, we re-estimate our primary
regressions for forecasts made outside the last ten days of these months (“non-season” forecasts)
and those made within the last ten days of January, April, July, and October (“season” forecasts).
In Table 7, we provide the results of re-estimating equation (6), which underlies Table 3, for
our two data partitions. The coefficients on CIG SURP for each of the three announcement period
windows in the “non-season” partition are 1.168, 1.986, and 3.816, which are all slightly smaller
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in economic magnitude than those found in Table 3, although statistical significance is achieved
at the 5% level or better for each window. In addition, F-tests reveal that the coefficients on
CIG SURP for forecasts made during forecasting “seasons” are statistically larger than those for
forecasts made during forecasting “non-seasons” for the (-1,+1) and (-1,+3) windows, suggesting
that bunched forecasts likely partially contribute to our primary findings in Table 3. However, the
significance of the CIG SURP coefficients in the “non-season” sub-sample imply that our primary
results are not attributable solely to periods of intense forecast bunching.
6.1.2 Return Window Width
In addition to bunching with other forecasts, earnings guidance is not necessarily released to the
market independent of other macro-relevant news events. On any given day, there are a range of
economic variables that governmental agencies release including: GDP, inflation, unemployment,
crude inventories, home sales, factory order, and consumer confidence, just to name a few. In order
to alleviate some concerns regarding coincident events, we re-estimate our regressions using a return
window of one day, the guidance announcement date.14 The one-day window results corroborate
our primary findings and reduce the likelihood that coincident events drive the multi-day window
results presented in our primary analysis. For example, the estimations that include macroeconomic
time series control variables yield a coefficient on CIG SURP that is 1.402 (statistically significant
at the 1% level) for high macro firms and 0.0379 (statistically insignificant at the 10% level or
better) for low macro firms. The difference of 1.3641 is statistically significant at the 5% level. The
coefficient of 1.402 is only 5.1% less than the comparable coefficient for the (-1,+1) window, which
suggests that the results in a tighter event window are reflecting similar news.
6.2 Measuring Forecast Surprise
Rogers and Van Buskirk (2012) show that the standard measure of forecast surprise may mis-
specify the incremental information content of the forecast if the forecast is bundled together with
an earnings announcement. Their assertion is based upon the observation that the analyst forecast
used to compute CIG SURPi,t does not incorporate the new information contained in the earnings
realization bundled with the forecast. Consequently, Rogers and Van Buskirk (2012) devise an
14We use the trading day following the guidance announcement if the announcement occurs after trading hours.
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approach for estimating the conditional consensus forecast and associated forecast surprise. We
re-estimate our primary regressions using the alternative forecast surprise measure and find that
the estimated coefficients are similar, though slightly dampened.
6.3 Measuring Macroeconomic Information Content
Our approach for identifying the macroeconomic information content of forecasts has relied upon
an in-sample, data-intensive methodology, suggesting a possibility of significant hindsight and over-
fitting in identifying firms high macro firms. Both of these observations merit some supplementary
analysis to assess whether a methodology not involving hindsight or a simpler methodology might do
as well in identifying firms with higher macroeconomic content forecasts. In addition, we examine
whether our results are sensitive to how we partition firms into high and low macro categories based
on the estimation of regression (4).
6.3.1 Hindsight
The hindsight issue is of concern from an implementation perspective because researchers and
analysts generally do not have the benefit of hindsight for identifying which firm forecasts have
higher macroeconomic information content. Furthermore, one might attribute the drift (larger
coefficients for longer return windows) observed in our earlier analysis of high macro firm forecasts
as being attributable to hindsight bias. To see why, consider a world in which market participants
do not know exactly which firms have the most macroeconomic information. As a consequence,
aggregate market prices respond in part to all firm disclosures because market participants know,
on average, that some have macroeconomic content. In turn, the market under-reacts to the truly
high macro forecasts and prices exhibit drift in the direction of truly high macro forecasts. This line
of reasoning also implies that prices should overreact to those disclosures with low macroeconomic
content and that reversals should be observed for such disclosures. While we have observed some
evidence of the drift associated with high macro firm forecasts, we have not observed evidence of
reversals associated with low macro firm forecasts. If the initial reactions are small enough and
high macro firms are rare, however, the initial reactions and subsequent reversals might be difficult
to detect in the data.
In order to address the hindsight issue, we first employ a rolling approach, which involves re-
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estimating regression (4) using varying lagged forecast windows for estimation of the r2s statistic
used to categorize the level of macroeconomic information content. In our base analysis, we use all
available forecast observations for a particular firm to estimate macroeconomic information content.
As part of our rolling approach, we limit the number of lagged quarters per firm (i.e., 15, 20, 25, 30)
and compare our estimated partial r2s statistic to that obtained from the base analysis. Using that
approach, we find that firms with a high macro designation in our base analysis have roughly a 90%
likelihood of having the high macro designation in our various rolling approach iterations. This
observation suggests that macroeconomic information content is fairly sticky across time, which
implies that hindsight does not play a significant role in identifying high macro firms.
Next, we re-estimate regression (6) using out-of-sample guidance from the period 2009 – 2011
and high/low macro designations from the period 2000 – 2008. Hence, this out-of-sample test does
not involve hindsight in identifying high and low macroeconomic content firms. The results of
our out-of-sample estimation of regression (6) corroborate our primary analysis in documenting a
statistically significant positive association between announcement period aggregate stock returns
and firm-level earnings guidance news only for high macro firms, albeit the levels of significance are
somwhat weaker. Further, the pattern of increasing coefficients observed in the base sample, which
is consistent with some notion of drift, disappears in the out-of-sample analysis, which is consistent
with hindsight giving rise to the drift observed in our earlier results.
6.3.2 Single Factor Approach
We also consider a simpler, single factor approach for identifying high macroeconomic information
content firms to ascertain whether the identification of high macro firms could be done with less
data. For each firm’s forecast, we estimate an earnings beta by regressing a firm’s lagged series
of earnings on a value-weighted index of earnings from all Compustat firms for the corresponding
quarters. Analogous to the approach used by Hann et al. (2012), we use the estimated coefficient
on the value-weighted index earnings as an estimate of firms’ sensitivities to macroeconomic infor-
mation, we categorize firms as high macro if their earnings beta falls in the highest sample quartile
(EBETA). Next, we re-estimate our various market response tests and compare them to those
estimated using our multi-factor approach.
The single factor approach generally yields results consistent with our base analysis albeit
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with somewhat diminished statistical significance, suggesting a single-factor approach is effective
at identifying firms with high macroeconomic content forecasts. When we include both the single
factor proxy alongside the multi-factor proxy for high macroeconomic information content in a
single regression, however, the latter proxy subsumes the former as the single factor proxy loses all
statistical significance.
6.3.3 Alternative Quantiles
We consider a firm to possess high macroeconomic information content if the firm has a partial
R2 associated with macroeconomic state variables in the upper quartile of r2s from regression (4).
Because the bivariate partition of the data into “high macro” and “low macro” is very coarse, we
constructed finer partitions of the data to ascertain whether the pattern established in the coarse
partition extends to finer partitions. To do this, we re-run our primary analysis using several
different quantiles (terciles, quintiles, deciles, and vigintiles) and find that statistically significant
results tend to cluster at the upper end of the distribution and statistically insignificant results in
the remainder of the distribution. For example, when we consider whether there is a statistically
significant relation between the forecast surprise and market returns for either the first, second, or
third quartiles individually, we find that none exists.
6.4 Other Firm Attributes
6.4.1 Size and Market Response to Management Forecasts
Anilowski et al. (2007) provide evidence that qualitative forecasts made by larger firms have broader
spillover effects than forecasts by smaller firms, which suggests that larger firms are bellwether firms.
Given our analytical framework, one reason why larger firms may serve as bellwether firms is that
their forecasts contain more macroeconomic information than other firms. In other words, size is a
proxy for macroeconomic content. However, the fact that high macro firms are smaller than other
firms in our sample, and that our proxy for size (market capitalization) is imperfectly correlated
with our measure of macroeconomic content (ρ = −0.074, which is statistically significant at the
1% level), suggests that size is a different proxy than our measure macroeconomic content. Hence,
it is unclear whether size is a complement to or a substitute for our measure and, if it is the latter,
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it is unclear whether the macroeconomic content captured in our metric subsumes or is subsumed
by size.
To attempt to ascertain the role size might play in explaining market-wide spillover effects
over and above the macroeconomic information proxy we employ, we run the following stacked
regression:
CRi,t = HI MACROIND=1(α + β1CIG SURPi,t + β2SIZE INDi,t (9)
+ β3CIG SURPi,t ∗ SIZE INDi,t +
∑
γCONTROLS + εi,t)
+ HI MACROIND=0(α + β1CIG SURPi,t + β2SIZE INDi,t
+ β3CIG SURPi,t ∗ SIZE INDi,t +
∑
γCONTROLS + εi,t)
where SIZE IND equals 1 if the firm is in the highest sample quartile of market capitalization.
If SIZE IND reflects bellwether firms beyond what is captured by our proxy for high macroeco-
nomic information content, we expect β3 > 0. Again, β1 continues to load in the predicted direction
where HI MACROIND = 1 and is statistically greater than where HI MACROIND = 0, which is
statistically insignificant at the 10% level or better in all return windows examined. The coefficient
on CIG SURPi,t ∗ SIZE INDi,t, β3, is not statistically significant once controlling for macroeco-
nomic information content as proxied for by HI MACRO. Hence, we provide no evidence that size
reflects firm disclosures with more macroeconomic information content incremental to our proxy
for macroeconomic information content, HI MACRO.
6.4.2 Forecast Accuracy and Pessimism
Our analytical framework discussed in section 4.1 allows for the possibility that managers may bias
their forecasts based on their incentives. As has been discussed in the prior literature, manage-
rial biasing activities are often conjectured to be associated with lower responses to management
disclosures as a result of market participants anticipating the biasing activities of management.
Consistent with this conjecture, Rogers and Stocken (2005) find that market-adjusted equity re-
turns for a firm are more positive (less negative) in response to that firm’s management forecasts
if market participants believe those forecasts are less upwardly biased (i.e., more pessimistic). If
we extend this intuition to our analysis, one possible reason for our findings is that our high macro
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forecasts are simply less biased or more accurate, which would suggest that it is not the nature of
private information underlying the forecast but the manner in which that information is commu-
nicated that matters. As an extreme example, it could be the case that all firms have identically
precise underlying macroeconomic information but that the management of high macro firms have
less of an incentive to bias their forecasts. That fact that high macro forecasts have lower bias (i.e.,
are more conservative) and are more accurate is consistent with this possibility.
To assess the likelihood that our high macro variable is solely a proxy for either forecast accuracy
or pessimism, we estimate the following regressions:
CRi,t = β0 + β1HI MACRO + β2FCST IND + β3CIG SURPi,t (10)
+ β4HI MACRO ∗ CIG SURPi,t + β5FCST IND ∗ CIG SURPi,t
+
∑
γCONTROLS + ε
where FCST IND ∈ {ACCURACY, PESSIMISM}, ACCURACY is a binary variable set
equal to one if a firm’s average earnings guidance accuracy, defined as the absolute value of guidance
less realized earnings, is in the highest sample quartile and zero otherwise, and PESSIMISM is a
binary variable set equal to one if a firm’s average earnings guidance pessimism, defined as guidance
less realized earnings, is in the lowest sample quartile and zero otherwise.
In untabulated results of regression (10) for ACCURACY , we find that the coefficient on
HI MACRO ∗ CIG SURP is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level across the (-
1,+1), (-1,+3), and (-1,+10) announcement period windows (1.885, 2.556, and 6.338 respectively).
Conversely, the coefficients on ACCURACY ∗ CIG SURP are all statistically indistinguishable
from zero at the 10% level or better. For PESSIMISM , we find similar results, with the coeffi-
cients on HI MACRO ∗CIG SURP estimated at 1.463 (statistically significant at the 10% level),
3.192 (statistically significant at the 5% level), and 7.794 (statistically significant at the 1% level)
across the three announcement period windows. The coefficients on PESSIMISM ∗CIG SURP
are all statistically indistinguishable from zero. Hence, our analysis of forecast accuracy and pes-
simism in conjunction with our proxy for macroeconomic content suggests that our primary results
are not attributable to characteristics of firms’ earnings guidance rather than their underlying
macroeconomic information.
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6.5 Timing
In the final set of supplemental analyses, we assess whether the associations we document are
attributed to forecasts during particular periods. First, we assess whether there is a significant
difference in associations between firms that forecast early in a calendar quarter and late in a
calendar quarter. To do so, we re-estimate our primary regressions for firms announcing earnings
guidance in the latter half of a calendar quarter and the earlier half of a calendar quarter. We
find no significant differences in the association between guidance news and aggregate stock market
returns based on when earnings guidance is released during a calendar quarter.
Second, given the observation that i) bad news forecasts tend to garner a larger response than
good news forecasts and ii) the 2008 financial crisis was such a significant bad news event, it is
conceivable that our results are driven by forecast surprises in 2008. We re-estimate our primary
regressions with 2008 observations excluded from our data set and find that the coefficients on
CIG SURP are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for high macro firms and
statistically indistinguishable from zero at conventional levels for low macro firms.
7 Conclusion
The evidence presented in this study suggests that bundled quantitative earnings guidance from
bellwether firms, which are defined as those firms for which macroeconomic state realizations explain
the greatest variation in their earnings forecasts, provide timely macroeconomic news. The forecasts
of such firms are associated with aggregate stock market returns around their forecast announcement
window, whereas non-bundled forecasts and the forecasts of non-bellwether firms are not. Further,
the bundled forecasts of bellwether firms are associated with the returns of firms inside and outside
the forecasting firm’s industry, suggesting that the macroeconomic news pertains to shocks affecting
many industries as opposed to a single industry. Consistent with prior firm-specific findings on how
the market responds to attributes of management forecasts, the aggregate market response to
bundled forecasts of bellwether firms is greater for bad news and point forecasts. Finally, changes
in market-wide uncertainty, as measured by the VIX, are negatively associated with the bundled
forecast of bellwether firms, which corroborates the associations identified for equity prices.
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Appendix
Macro Factor Derivation Procedure
1. We first obtain quarterly earnings realizations for all firms for 1995–2008, which correspond
to the availability of management forecast data.
2. We then randomly assign firms to 20 portfolios in order to reduce the dimensionality of the
earnings series (i.e., more quarters than earnings series).
3. Next, we aggregate firm earnings by each portfolio and quarter to arrive at 1,120 (20 portfolios
x 56 quarters) aggregate earnings portfolio quarters.
4. Let the time series of each portfolio represent the variable of interest for factor analysis.
5. Factor analysis is conducted to extract the common variance (or latent structure) across
variables that explains the most variance with the fewest variables. We keep three factors on
the basis that each explains at least as much variation as a single variable, which cumulatively
explain 72% of the variation in the earnings series. From this, we obtain the time-invariant
factor loadings for each variable.
6. Lastly, we “score” the variables by quarter by taking the scalar product of the standardized
variables and each factor loading to arrive at a set of factor scores by quarter. The time-
variant factors scores (three for each quarter) represent our macroeconomic factor, or M, in
our analytic framework.
33
References
Anilowski, C., Feng, M., Skinner, D. J., 2007. Does earnings guidance affect market returns?
the nature and information content of aggregate earnings guidance. Journal of Accounting and
Economics 44 (1–2), 36–63.
Baginski, S., 1987. Intra-industry information transfers associated with management forecasts of
earnings. Journal of Accounting Research 25, 196–216.
Baginski, S. P., Conrad, E. J., Hassell, J. M., 1993. The effects of management forecast precision
on equity pricing and on the assessment of earnings uncertainty. The Accounting Review 68 (4),
913–927.
Baker, S. R., Bloom, N., Davis, S. J., 2012. Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty. Working
paper, Stanford University and University of Chicago.
Ball, R., Sadka, G., Sadka, R., 2009. Aggregate earnings and asset prices. Journal of Accounting
Research 47 (5), 1097–1133.
Ball, R., Shivakumar, L., 2008. How Much New Information Is There in Earnings? Journal of
Accounting Research 46 (5), 975–1016.
Barro, R. J., 1990. The stock market and investment. The Review of Financial Studies 3 (1),
115–131.
Ben-David, I., Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., 2012. Managerial miscalibration. Charles A. Dice
Center Working Paper No. 2010-12; Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2010-03-012;
AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1640552.
Beyer, A., Cohen, D. A., Lys, T. Z., Walther, B. R., 2010. The financial reporting environment:
Review of the recent literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50 (2–3), 296–343.
Black, F., 1976. Studies of stock price volatility. In: Proceedings of the 1976 Meeting of the Amer-
ican Statistical Association, Business and Economic Statistics Section.
Brown, P., Ball, R., 1967. Some preliminary findings on the association between the earnings of a
firm, its industry, and the economy. Journal of Accounting Research 5, 55–77.
Campbell, J. Y., 1991. A variance decomposition for stock returns. The Economic Journal 101 (405),
157–179.
Campbell, J. Y., Hentschel, L., 1992. No news is good news: An asymmetric model of changing
volatility in stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics 31 (3), 281–318.
Chen, N. F., Roll, R., Ross, S. A., 1986. Economic forces and the stock market. Journal of Business
59 (3), 383–403.
Choi, J. H., Kalay, A., Sadka, G., 2012. Earnings News and Aggregate Stock Returns. Working
paper, Columbia University.
Christie, A. A., 1982. The stochastic behavior of common stck variances: Value, leverage and
interest rate effects. Journal of Financial Economics 10 (4), 407–432.
34
Christofferson, P., Ghysels, E., Swanson, N. R., 2002. Let’s get “real” about using economic data.
Journal of Empirical Finance 9 (3), 343–360.
Clinch, N. A., Sinclair, G. J., 1987. Intra-industry information releases: A recursive systems ap-
proach. Journal of Accounting and Economics 9 (1), 89–106.
Cohen, L., Frazzini, A., 2008. Economic Links and Prdictable Returns. The Journal of Finance
63 (4), 1977–2011.
Cready, W. M., Gurun, U. G., 2010. Aggregate market reaction to earnings announcements. Journal
of Accounting Research 48 (2), 289–334.
Dye, R. A., 1985. Disclosure of nonproprietary information. Journal of Accounting Research 23 (1),
123–145.
Fama, E. F., 1981. Stock returns, real activity, inflation, and money. The American Economic
Review 71 (4), 545–565.
Fama, E. F., 1990. Stock returns, expected returns, and real activity. Journal of Finance 45, 1089–
1108.
Flannery, M. J., Protopapadakis, A. A., 2002. Macroeconomic Factors Do Influence Aggregate
Stock Returns. The Review of Financial Studies 15 (3), 751–782.
Foster, G., 1981. Intra-industry information transfers associated with earnings releases. Journal of
Accounting and Economics 3 (3), 201–232.
French, K. R., Schwert, G. W., Stambaugh, R. F., 1987. Expcted stock returns and volatility.
Journal of Financial Economics 19 (1), 3–29.
Hann, R. N., Ogneva, M., Sapriza, H., 2012. Forecasting the Macroeconomy: Analysts versus
Economists. Working paper, University of Maryland, Stanford University, and the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Hutton, A. P., Lee, L. F., Shu, S., 2012. Do managers always know better? An examination of the
relative accuracy of management and analyst forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research 50 (5),
1217–1244.
Hutton, A. P., Miller, G. S., Skinner, D. J., 2003. The role of supplementary statements with
management earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research 41 (5), 867–890.
Kim, K., Pandit, S., Wasley, C. E., 2012. Aggregate uncertainty and the issuance of management
earnings forecasts. Working paper, University of Missouri at Columbia, University of Illinois at
Chicago, and University of Rochester.
Lang, M., Lundholm, R., 1996. The relation between security returns, firm earnings, and industry
earnings. Contemporary Accounting Research 13 (2), 607–629.
Liu, L. X., Zhang, L., 2008. Momentum Profits, Factor Pricing, and Macroeconomic Risk. The
Review of Financial Studies 21 (6), 2417–2448.
McCulla, S. H., Smith, S., September 2007. Measuring the economy: A primer on GDP and
the national income and product accounts. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of
Commerce.
35
Milian, J. A., 2010. The Relative Information Content of Guidance and Earnings. Working paper,
Florida Internation University.
Pownall, G., Wasley, C., Waymire, G., 1993. The stock price effects of alternative types of man-
agement earnings forecasts. The Accounting Review 68 (4), 896–912.
Pownall, G., Waymire, G., 1989. Voluntary disclosure and earnings information transfers. Journal
of Accounting Research 27 (Supp), 85–105.
Rogers, J. L., Skinner, D. J., Van Buskirk, A., 2009. Earnings guidance and market uncertainty.
Journal of Accounting and Economics 48 (1), 90–109.
Rogers, J. L., Stocken, P. C., 2005. Credibility of Management Forecasts. The Accounting Review
80 (4), 1233–1260.
Rogers, J. L., Van Buskirk, A., 2012. Bundled forecasts in empirical accounting research. Journal
of Accounting and Economics, forthcoming.
Sadka, G., 2007. Understanding stock price volatility: the role of earnings. Journal of Accounting
Research 45, 199–228.
Schwert, G. W., 1990. Stock returns and real activity: a century of evidence. Journal of Finance
45, 1237–1257.
Shivakumar, L., 2010. Discussion of aggregate market reaction to earnings announcements. Journal
of Accounting Research 48 (2), 335–342.
Skinner, D. J., 1994. Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news. Journal of Accounting Research
32 (1), 38–60.
Soffer, L. C., Thiagarajan, S. R., Walther, B. R., 2000. Earnings preannouncement strategies.
Review of Accounting Studies 5 (1), 5–26.
Thomas, J. K., Zhang, F., 2008. Overreaction to intra-industry information transfers? Journal of
Accounting Research 46 (4), 909–940.
Verrecchia, R. E., 1983. Discretionary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics 5 (179–194).
Vuolteenaho, T., 2002. What drives firm-level stock returns? Journal of Finance 57 (1), 233–264.
Wu, G., 2001. The Determinants of Asymmetric Volatility. The Review of Financial Studies 14 (3),
837–859.
36
Figure 1: Histogram of r
2
s
r2i
− R2e
1−R2e from Regressions (3) and (4)
Figure 1 presents the distribution of the differences between the ratio of macroeconomic information in firms’ earnings
guidance (
r2s
r2i
) and the ratio of its underlying historical earnings (
R2e
1−R2e
).
r2s
r2i
is computed as the semi-partial R2 of
the estimated macroeconomic factor (r2s) divided by the semi-partial R
2 of the estimated firm-specific factor (r2i )
from Regression (4) for explaining variation in earnings guidance.
R2e
1−R2e
is computed as the R2 divided by 1 − R2
from Regression (3) for explaining the sensitivity of a firm’s historical earnings to the macroeconomic state variables.
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Figure 2: Histogram of r2s from Regression (4)
Figure 2 presents the distribution of the estimated macroeconomic information in firms’ earnings guidance, r2s .
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Company issued earnings guidance surprise (CIG SURP) is calculated as the actual guidance given by management
(CIG ACTUAL) less the most recent analyst consensus prior to the announcement date scaled by beginning of
quarter price. Analyst earnings surprise (ANALYST SURP) is calculated as realized earnings (EARN ACTUAL)
less the most recent analyst consensus prior to the announcement date scaled by beginning of quarter price. Assets
(ASSETS), sales (SALES), and market capitalization (MARKET CAP) are obtained prior to the announcement date
at the beginning of the quarter. The remaining variables are macroeconomic time series (MTS) forecasts made in
the quarter prior to the announcement date for the current quarter and are from the Philadelphia Federal Reserve
Bank’s Survey of Professional Forecasters, where BOND is the level of Moody’s AAA corporate bond yield, CPI is
the consumer price index inflation rate, HOUSING is the level of housing starts, INDPROD is the level of the index
of industrial production, RGDP is the level of real gross domestic product, TBILL is the three-month Treasury bill
rate, TBOND is the 10-year Treasury bond rate, and UNEMP is the unemployment rate. Further detail on MTS
forecast variable calculations can be found at http://www.philadelphiafed.org.
Panel A - Overall Sample
Standard 25th 75th
Variable N Mean Median Deviation Percentile Percentile
Firm Variables
CIG SURP 16,824 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0272 -0.0019 0.0009
ANALYST SURP 16,824 -0.0015 0.0000 0.0389 -0.0017 0.0014
CIG ACTUAL 16,824 0.35 0.27 0.38 0.11 0.50
EARN ACTUAL 16,824 0.32 0.26 0.40 0.11 0.46
ASSETS ($m) 16,167 1,447 391 3,898 156 1,150
SALES ($m) 16,807 1,165 240 4,366 79 755
MARKET CAP ($m) 16,824 3,100 716 11,300 220 2,290
MTS Variables
BOND 16,824 6.04 5.90 0.49 5.72 6.20
CPI 16,824 2.30 2.35 0.38 2.02 2.54
HOUSING (m) 16,824 1.65 1.68 0.27 1.55 1.87
INDPROD 16,824 122 116 12 113 121
RDGP ($b) 16,824 10,749 11,078 906 9,616 11,561
TBILL 16,824 3.00 2.92 1.53 1.67 4.61
TBOND 16,824 4.68 4.66 0.42 4.44 4.91
UNEMP 16,824 5.26 5.23 0.54 4.76 5.84
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Panel B - Overall Sample by Macroeconomic Information Content
High Macroeconomic Information Content Firms
Standard 25th 75th
Variable N Mean Median Deviation Percentile Percentile
Firm Variables
CIG SURP 3,830 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0390 -0.0017 0.0004
ANALYST SURP 3,830 -0.0003 0.0004 0.0389 -0.0011 0.0018
CIG ACTUAL 3,830 0.29 0.22 0.35 0.09 0.42
EARN ACTUAL 3,830 0.30 0.23 0.38 0.10 0.43
ASSETS ($m) 3,637 1,184 276 3,937 124 772
SALES ($m) 3,830 863 144 3,349 53 391
MARKET CAP ($m) 3,830 2,170 576 4,950 173 1,930
Low Macroeconomic Information Content Firms
Standard 25th 75th
Variable N Mean Median Deviation Percentile Percentile
Firm Variables
CIG SURP 12,994 -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0226 -0.0019 0.0014
ANALYST SURP 12,994 -0.0018 0.0000 0.0389 -0.0018 0.0013
CIG ACTUAL 12,994 0.37 0.29 0.39 0.12 0.52
EARN ACTUAL 12,994 0.33 0.26 0.41 0.11 0.47
ASSETS ($m) 12,530 1,523 436 3,883 169 1,280
SALES ($m) 12,977 1,254 284 4,620 92 928
MARKET CAP ($m) 12,994 3,380 762 12,500 240 2,410
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Panel C - Industry Breakdown by Macroeconomic Information Content
High Macroeconomic Information Content Firms
Industry N Percent
Mining 61 2%
Manufacturing 1,682 44%
Transport and Comm. 115 3%
Retail 366 10%
Finance 199 5%
Services 1,407 37%
3,830 100%
Low Macroeconomic Information Content Firms
Industry N Percent
Agriculture 10 0.1%
Mining 276 2%
Manufacturing 6,298 48%
Transport and Comm. 547 4%
Retail 2,425 19%
Finance 361 3%
Services 3,048 23%
Public Admin. 27 0.2%
12,994 100%
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Table 2: The Market Reaction to Guidance
Regression tests on the reaction of several market return windows to company issued guidance surprise (CIG SURP) for bundled and unbundled forecasts. CR
is the cumulative value-weighted market return excluding firm i over the t days surrounding the release of the management forecast. CIG SURP is calculated
as the actual guidance given by management less the most recent analyst consensus prior to the announcement date scaled by beginning of quarter price.
ANALYST SURP is calculated as realized earnings less the most recent analyst consensus prior to the announcement date scaled by beginning of quarter price.
The remaining variables are macroeconomic time series (MTS) forecasts made in the quarter prior to the announcement date for the current quarter and are
from the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank’s Survey of Professional Forecasters, where BOND is the level of Moody’s AAA corporate bond yield, CPI is the
consumer price index inflation rate, HOUSING is the level of housing starts, INDPROD is the level of the index of industrial production, RGDP is the level of
real gross domestic product, TBILL is the three-month Treasury bill rate, TBOND is the 10-year Treasury bond rate, and UNEMP is the unemployment rate.
Further detail on MTS forecast variable calculations can be found at http://www.philadelphiafed.org. Results below are presented both with and without the
MTS forecast control variables.
Dependent Variable
Predicted Bundled Forecasts Unbundled Forecasts
Variable Sign CR (-1,+1) CR (-1,+3) CR (-1,+10) CR (-1,+1) CR (-1,+3) CR (-1,+10)
No MTS Controls
CIG SURP + 0.796** 1.546*** 3.470*** 1.085* 0.906 -1.193
(0.415) (0.504) (0.960) (0.805) (1.206) (1.911)
ANALYST SURP -0.515 0.0509 0.904
(0.315) (0.623) (1.397)
With MTS Controls
CIG SURP + 0.598* 1.416*** 2.850*** 0.603 0.325 -2.420
(0.424) (0.495) (1.084) (0.727) (1.381) (2.104)
ANALYST SURP -0.540** -0.00599 0.571
(0.249) (0.538) (1.019)
BOND -0.877 -0.668 -4.280* -0.792 -0.858 -3.439*
(0.845) (1.205) (2.382) (0.779) (0.951) (1.995)
CPI 0.903*** 1.107*** 3.653*** 0.386 0.645 3.113***
(0.269) (0.365) (0.897) (0.375) (0.600) (1.088)
HOUSING 0.484 0.894 2.149* 1.130*** 1.488*** 3.009***
(0.358) (0.589) (1.176) (0.400) (0.461) (0.992)
INDPROD -0.0135 -0.0246 -0.0534 -0.0134 -0.0236 -0.0668
(0.0156) (0.0247) (0.0509) (0.0111) (0.0201) (0.0413)
Continued on next page
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RGDP -0.000696* -0.000735 -0.00291*** -0.000650* -0.000926** -0.00299***
(0.000376) (0.000481) (0.00103) (0.000394) (0.000416) (0.000857)
TBILL -0.197 -0.175 -0.910 -0.0761 -0.117 -0.717
(0.160) (0.225) (0.595) (0.214) (0.250) (0.520)
TBOND 0.481 0.149 2.610 0.0330 -0.432 0.602
(0.681) (1.030) (2.252) (0.530) (0.680) (1.580)
UNEMP -0.662 -0.603 -2.016 -0.566 -0.979 -2.556**
(0.517) (0.724) (1.542) (0.565) (0.654) (1.166)
Observations 13,403 13,403 13,388 3,418 3,418 3,410
R-squared 0.016 0.017 0.101 0.021 0.026 0.076
Clustered standard errors (firm and quarter) are provided in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels is denoted by ***, **, and *
respectively.
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Table 3: The Guidance of Firms with High Macroeconomic Information Content
This table extends the framework of Table 2 for bundled earnings guidance observations by estimating regressions stacked by an indicator variable (Hi Macro)
for firms considered to possess high macroeconomic information content as defined by those firms in the uppermost quartile of the semi-partial R-squared for the
systemic component in Equation (4), or r2s . CR is the cumulative value-weighted market return excluding firm i over the t days surrounding the release of the
management forecast. CIG SURP is calculated as the actual guidance given by management less the most recent analyst consensus prior to the announcement
date scaled by beginning of quarter price. ANALYST SURP is calculated as realized earnings less the most recent analyst consensus prior to the announcement
date scaled by beginning of quarter price. The remaining variables are macroeconomic time series (MTS) forecasts made in the quarter prior to the announcement
date for the current quarter and are from the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank’s Survey of Professional Forecasters, where BOND is the level of Moody’s AAA
corporate bond yield, CPI is the consumer price index inflation rate, HOUSING is the level of housing starts, INDPROD is the level of the index of industrial
production, RGDP is the level of real gross domestic product, TBILL is the three-month Treasury bill rate, TBOND is the 10-year Treasury bond rate, and
UNEMP is the unemployment rate. Further detail on MTS forecast variable calculations can be found at http://www.philadelphiafed.org. Results below are
presented both with and without the MTS forecast control variables.
Dependent Variable
Predicted CR (-1,+1) CR (-1,+3) CR (-1,+10)
Variable Sign Hi MacroIND=1 Hi MacroIND=0 Hi MacroIND=1 Hi MacroIND=0 Hi MacroIND=1 Hi MacroIND=0
No MTS Controls
CIG SURP + 1.477*** 2.448*** 5.045***
(0.264) (0.415) (0.445)
CIG SURP -0.601*** 0.0834 1.899
(0.0522) (0.907) (2.150)
ANALYST SURP -0.713 -0.0689 0.207 0.432 2.274*** 1.017
(0.664) (0.442) (0.938) (0.862) (0.843) (1.804)
With MTS Controls
CIG SURP + 1.328*** 2.306*** 4.408***
(0.358) (0.307) (0.776)
CIG SURP -0.824 -0.107 0.947
(0.566) (1.096) (2.266)
ANALYST SURP -0.668 -0.136 0.142 0.387 2.058** 0.790
(0.708) (0.311) (1.047) (0.749) (0.973) (1.368)
BOND 0.0570 -1.161 0.0928 -0.896 -4.783* -4.117*
(0.861) (0.882) (1.324) (1.174) (2.692) (2.298)
CPI 0.834*** 0.920*** 0.989** 1.141*** 4.105*** 3.517***
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(0.258) (0.285) (0.418) (0.353) (1.012) (0.868)
HOUSING 0.471 0.491 1.070* 0.845 2.117 2.157*
(0.375) (0.362) (0.638) (0.574) (1.299) (1.143)
INDPROD -0.0134 -0.0134 -0.0261 -0.0242 -0.0450 -0.0558
(0.0170) (0.0154) (0.0261) (0.0243) (0.0539) (0.0501)
RGDP -0.000318 -0.000814** -0.000492 -0.000811* -0.00322*** -0.00281***
(0.000346) (0.000405) (0.000519) (0.000473) (0.00118) (0.000995)
TBILL -0.0645 -0.236 -0.105 -0.195 -1.052 -0.871
(0.178) (0.166) (0.254) (0.217) (0.686) (0.572)
TBOND -0.192 0.683 -0.543 0.351 2.948 2.503
(0.763) (0.689) (1.134) (1.006) (2.498) (2.189)
UNEMP -0.288 -0.778 -0.533 -0.627 -2.334 -1.939
(0.477) (0.556) (0.731) (0.725) (1.718) (1.511)
Observations 3,089 10,314 3,089 10,314 3,087 10,301
R-squared 0.015 0.019 0.017 0.018 0.122 0.096
F-test 2.15** 2.41* 3.46*
Clustered standard errors (firm and quarter) are provided in parentheses. The F-test computes the difference between the coefficients on CIG SURP across the
Hi Macro partition (Hi MacroIND=1 − Hi MacroIND=0) from the regressions with MTS controls. Statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels is denoted
by ***, **, and * respectively.
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Table 4: The Impact of Proximity
This table compares the market response to bundled earnings guidance of those firms in close proximity to high macroeconomic information content guidance
providers (as defined by 4 digit SIC code, or Within SIC) to firms outside the major SIC division of the guidance firm (Outside Division). CR is the cumulative
value-weighted return excluding firm i over the t days surrounding the release of the management forecast. CIG SURP is calculated as the actual guidance given
by management less the most recent analyst consensus prior to the announcement date scaled by beginning of quarter price. ANALYST SURP is calculated
as realized earnings less the most recent analyst consensus prior to the announcement date scaled by beginning of quarter price. The remaining variables are
macroeconomic time series (MTS) forecasts made in the quarter prior to the announcement date for the current quarter and are from the Philadelphia Federal
Reserve Bank’s Survey of Professional Forecasters, where BOND is the level of Moody’s AAA corporate bond yield, CPI is the consumer price index inflation
rate, HOUSING is the level of housing starts, INDPROD is the level of the index of industrial production, RGDP is the level of real gross domestic product,
TBILL is the three-month Treasury bill rate, TBOND is the 10-year Treasury bond rate, and UNEMP is the unemployment rate. Further detail on MTS forecast
variable calculations can be found at http://www.philadelphiafed.org. Results below are presented both with and without the MTS forecast control variables.
Dependent Variable
Predicted CR (-1,+1) CR (-1,+3) CR (-1,+10)
Variable Sign Within SIC Outside Division Within SIC Outside Division Within SIC Outside Division
No MTS Controls
CIG SURP + 5.305*** 1.211*** 8.136*** 1.787*** 14.29*** 4.071***
(0.524) (0.308) (0.924) (0.498) (0.590) (0.509)
ANALYST SURP 1.377* -0.776 3.831** -0.376 6.782*** 1.622
(0.710) (0.616) (1.589) (1.167) (1.143) (1.043)
With MTS Controls
CIG SURP + 5.025*** 1.058** 7.991*** 1.676*** 14.48*** 4.156***
(0.518) (0.425) (0.778) (0.373) (0.724) (0.631)
ANALYST SURP 1.567** -0.723 3.887** -0.412 6.757*** 1.476
(0.740) (0.674) (1.745) (1.294) (1.442) (1.173)
BOND -0.242 -0.0255 -0.150 0.0537 -3.487 -2.883
(1.114) (0.972) (1.667) (1.400) (3.991) (2.842)
CPI 0.700 0.607 0.917 0.749 4.161** 3.957***
(0.517) (0.468) (0.838) (0.759) (1.789) (1.516)
HOUSING 0.650 1.362* 1.413 2.573** 2.671 3.550
(0.776) (0.818) (1.307) (1.311) (2.644) (2.326)
INDPROD 0.00468 -0.0166 -0.0145 -0.0327 -0.0440 -0.0658
(0.0224) (0.0174) (0.0360) (0.0265) (0.0738) (0.0509)
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RGDP -0.000433 -0.000517 -0.000625 -0.000791 -0.00272 -0.00262*
(0.000601) (0.000481) (0.000859) (0.000682) (0.00217) (0.00156)
TBILL -0.00110 0.0789 0.00366 0.0792 -0.119 -0.499
(0.259) (0.225) (0.384) (0.319) (1.002) (0.747)
TBOND -0.175 0.153 -0.406 0.0144 2.059 2.786
(1.054) (0.833) (1.567) (1.185) (3.590) (2.603)
UNEMP -0.260 -0.0709 -0.289 -0.200 0.455 -0.311
(1.002) (0.695) (1.449) (0.988) (3.090) (2.032)
Observations 2,673 2,673 2,673 2,673 2,672 2,673
R-squared 0.018 0.035 0.024 0.048 0.069 0.169
F-test 3.96*** 6.32*** 10.33**
Clustered standard errors (firm and quarter) are provided in parentheses. The F-test computes the difference between the coefficients on CIG SURP across the
proximity partition (Within SIC − Outside Division) from the regressions with MTS controls. Statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels is denoted
by ***, **, and * respectively.
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Table 5: Forecast Attributes
This table extends the framework of Table 3 on the bundled earnings guidance of high macroeconomic information content firms to examine forecast attributes.
Stacked regressions are provided to capture the sign of guidance surprise (POS SURP) and forecast precision (POINT). Panel A tests the joint reaction to high
macroeconomic information content and POS SURP where POS SURP is set to one for firms with a positive CIG SURP and zero otherwise. Panel B examines
whether guidance provided by firms with high macroeconomic information content is more informative if provided in the form of a point estimate where POINT
is set to one for firms which provide a point estimate and zero otherwise. CR is the cumulative value-weighted market return excluding firm i over the t days
surrounding the release of the management forecast. CIG SURP is calculated as the actual guidance given by management less the most recent analyst consensus
prior to the announcement date scaled by beginning of quarter price. ANALYST SURP is calculated as realized earnings less the most recent analyst consensus
prior to the announcement date scaled by beginning of quarter price. The remaining variables are macroeconomic time series (MTS) forecasts made in the quarter
prior to the announcement date for the current quarter and are from the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank’s Survey of Professional Forecasters. The MTS
forecast control variables have been suppressed for expositional economy.
Panel A Dependent Variable
Predicted CR (-1,+1) CR (-1,+3) CR (-1,+10)
Variable Sign POS SURPIND=1 POS SURPIND=0 POS SURPIND=1 POS SURPIND=0 POS SURPIND=1 POS SURPIND=0
No MTS Controls
CIG SURP + 1.557*** 20.79*** 2.255*** 37.23** 4.824*** 25.68
(0.261) (8.909) (0.500) (16.51) (0.405) (21.82)
ANALYST SURP -0.343 -20.16** 0.348 -20.21* 2.321*** -11.27
(0.416) (8.576) (0.857) (11.36) (0.695) (10.08)
With MTS Controls
CIG SURP + 1.294*** 22.11*** 2.487*** 35.34** 4.554*** 15.41
(0.267) (9.219) (0.732) (15.89) (1.165) (17.29)
ANALYST SURP -0.337 -20.01** 0.261 -21.50* 2.237*** -13.21
(0.435) (8.755) (0.896) (11.43) (0.776) (8.413)
Observations 895 2,194 895 2,194 895 2,192
R-squared 0.025 0.016 0.040 0.018 0.147 0.119
F-test 20.81** 32.86** 10.85
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Panel B Dependent Variable
Predicted CR (-1,+1) CR (-1,+3) CR (-1,+10)
Variable Sign POINTIND=1 POINTIND=0 POINTIND=1 POINTIND=0 POINTIND=1 POINTIND=0
No MTS Controls
CIG SURP + 23.55** 1.376*** 31.62** 2.329*** 65.83** 4.676***
(13.36) (0.329) (17.22) (0.461) (29.74) (0.675)
ANALYST SURP -7.621 -0.772 -9.800 0.146 -10.05 1.950**
(8.497) (0.684) (11.43) (0.875) (14.61) (0.977)
With MTS Controls
CIG SURP + 19.34* 1.173*** 28.71** 2.198*** 48.76** 4.060***
(13.08) (0.440) (17.75) (0.279) (23.93) (0.867)
ANALYST SURP -4.695 -0.675 -7.413 0.0990 -4.039 1.848*
(7.360) (0.736) (10.19) (0.998) (9.588) (1.115)
Observations 515 2,574 515 2,574 515 2,572
R-squared 0.040 0.014 0.049 0.015 0.148 0.122
F-test 18.17* 26.51* 44.70**
Clustered standard errors (firm and quarter) are provided in parentheses. In Panel A, the F-test computes the difference between the coefficients on CIG SURP
across the surprise partition (POS SURPIND=0 − POS SURPIND=1) from the regressions with MTS controls. In Panel B, the F-test computes the difference
between the coefficients on CIG SURP across the precision partition (PointIND=1 − PointIND=0) from the regressions with MTS controls. Statistical significance
at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels is denoted by ***, **, and * respectively.
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Table 6: Guidance Surprise and Uncertainty
This table extends the framework of Table 5, Panel A on the bundled earnings guidance of high macroeconomic information content firms to examine the impact
of guidance surprise asymmetry on overall market uncertainty where uncertainty is measured using the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index, or VIX.
VIX is calculated as the change in the value of the index in the t days surrounding the release of the management forecast. CIG SURP is calculated as the actual
guidance given by management less the most recent analyst consensus prior to the announcement date scaled by beginning of quarter price. ANALYST SURP is
calculated as realized earnings less the most recent analyst consensus prior to the announcement date scaled by beginning of quarter price. The remaining variables
are macroeconomic time series (MTS) forecasts made in the quarter prior to the announcement date for the current quarter and are from the Philadelphia Federal
Reserve Bank’s Survey of Professional Forecasters. The MTS forecast control variables have been suppressed for expositional economy.
Dependent Variable
Predicted ΔVIX (-1,0) ΔVIX (-1,+1)
Variable Sign POS SURPIND=1 POS SURPIND=0 POS SURPIND=1 POS SURPIND=0
No MTS Controls
CIG SURP - -1.485*** -23.48 -1.152*** -24.98*
(0.195) (19.81) (0.176) (15.95)
ANALYST SURP -0.0832 5.968 0.0574 19.24
(0.267) (3.886) (0.220) (15.04)
With MTS Controls
CIG SURP - -1.174*** -25.77* -0.650*** -29.78**
(0.0190) (19.24) (0.154) (14.08)
ANALYST SURP -0.139 5.430 -0.0153 18.24
(0.282) (4.166) (0.243) (15.86)
Observations 895 2,194 895 2,194
R-squared 0.021 0.012 0.021 0.017
F-test -24.60** -29.13**
Clustered standard errors (firm and quarter) are provided in parentheses. The F-test computes the difference between the coefficients on CIG SURP across the
surprise partition (POS SURPIND=0 − POS SURPIND=1) from the regressions with MTS controls. Statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels is
denoted by ***, **, and * respectively.
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Table 7: Forecast Bunching
This table provides supplemental analysis to examine the effect of forecast bunching on the aggregate stock market reaction to high macroeconomic content
earnings guidance. The regressions follow the format of those found in Table 3 for High MacroIND=1 firms and contrast bundled forecasts made during “seasons”
and “non-seasons.” Observations included in the season sub-sample are management earnings forecasts released during the last ten days of January, April, July,
and October. All other forecasts are categorized as non-season. CIG SURP is calculated as the actual guidance given by management less the most recent analyst
consensus prior to the announcement date scaled by beginning of quarter price. ANALYST SURP is calculated as realized earnings less the most recent analyst
consensus prior to the announcement date scaled by beginning of quarter price. The remaining variables are macroeconomic time series (MTS) forecasts made
in the quarter prior to the announcement date for the current quarter and are from the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank’s Survey of Professional Forecasters.
Results below are presented with the MTS forecast control variables, which have been suppressed for expositional economy.
Dependent Variable
Predicted CR (-1,+1) CR (-1,+3) CR (-1,+10)
Variable Sign Non-Season Season Non-Season Season Non-Season Season
CIG SURP + 1.168*** 17.95*** 1.986*** 36.02** 3.816*** 20.01*
(0.482) (7.697) (0.714) (20.90) (1.310) (13.38)
ANALYST SURP -0.399 -9.965** 0.571 -16.74** 2.366** -1.855
(0.593) (5.064) (0.695) (7.398) (0.959) (10.89)
Observations 1,532 1,557 1,532 1,557 1,530 1,557
R-squared 0.057 0.030 0.124 0.027 0.178 0.213
F-test 16.79* 34.03* 16.20
Clustered standard errors (firm and quarter) are provided in parentheses. The F-test computes the difference between the coefficients on CIG SURP across the
season partition (‘Season’ − ‘Non-Season’) from the regressions with MTS controls. Statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels is denoted by ***, **,
and * respectively.
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